During the Korean War the F-86 Sabre fought against the Soviet MiG-15 in dogfight aerial combats. Although developed in the late 1940s and outdated by the end of the 1950s, the Sabre proved adaptable and continued as a front line fighter in air forces until the last active front line examples were retired by the Bolivian Air Force in 1994. Its success led to an extended production run of more than 7,800 aircraft between 1949 and 1956, in the United States, Japan and Italy. It was by far the most-produced Western jet fighter, with total production of all variants at 9,860 units. Variants were built in Canada and Australia. The Canadair Sabre added another 1,815 airframes, and the significantly redesigned CAC Sabre had a production run of 112.

Specifications

The F-86F-40-NA was powered by one General Electric J47-GE-27 turbojet, 5,910 lbf (maximum thrust at 7.950 rpm for five min). Its maximum speed was 680 mph at 1,500 ft with 14,212 lb (6,447 kg) combat weight. It had a range of 1,525 miles. The F-86 had a length of 37 ft 1 in (11.4 m) and a wingspan of 37 ft 0 in (11.3 m). Crew: 1 (pilot).

Armament

Specifications

The Republic F-105D Thunderchief was powered by one Pratt & Whitney J75-P-19W afterburning turbojet, which rendered the aircraft a maximum speed of mach 2.08 (1,372 mph, or 2,208 km/h) at 36,000 ft. Its range was 2,210 miles and its service ceiling 48,400 ft, or 14,700 m. It had a length of 64 ft 4.75 in and a wingspan of 34 ft 11.25 in (10.65 m). Crew: one (pilot).

On January 12, 1968, 4 Vietnam People’s Air Force Antonov An-2 biplanes had attempted to destroy the base. The Antonov An-2 planes had reached LS 85 and begun dropping 120 mm mortar rounds on the site and making strafing runs. The battle of Lima Site 85 was initiated on the night of March 10, 1968, when the North Vietnamese Army 766th Regiment launched a diversionary attack, preceded by an artillery barrage, against the US landing base.

"…occasionally there are riveting communications, such as a recent e-mail from a noncommissioned officer (NCO) serving in Afghanistan. He explains why the rules of engagement for U.S. troops are too prohibitive for coalition forces to achieve sustained tactical successes.

"Receiving mortar fire during an overnight mission, his unit called for a 155mm howitzer illumination round to be fired to reveal the enemy’s location. The request was rejected “on the grounds that it may cause collateral damage.” The NCO says that the only thing that comes down from an illumination round is a canister, and the likelihood of it hitting someone or something was akin to that of being struck by lightning.

"Returning from a mission, his unit took casualties from an improvised explosive device that the unit knew had been placed no more than an hour earlier. “There were villagers laughing at the U.S. casualties” and “two suspicious individuals were seen fleeing the scene and entering a home.” U.S. forces “are no longer allowed to search homes without Afghan National Security Forces personnel present.” But when his unit asked Afghan police to search the house, the police refused on the grounds that the people in the house "are good people."

"On another mission, some Afghan adults ran off with their children immediately before the NCO’s unit came under heavy small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and the unit asked for artillery fire on the enemy position. The response was a question: Where is the nearest civilian structure? “Judging distances,” the NCO writes dryly, “can be difficult when bullets and RPGs are flying over your head.” When the artillery support was denied because of fear of collateral damage, the unit asked for a “smoke mission” — like an illumination round; only the canister falls to earth — “to conceal our movement as we planned to flank and destroy the enemy.” This request was granted — but because of fear of collateral damage, the round was deliberately fired one kilometer off the requested site, making the smoke mission useless and leaving us to fend for ourselves."

Analysis of the rules of engagement in Afghanistan

This letter seems to have been written in the spirit of The NCOs Speak on Rules of Engagement. Legendary Marine Chesty Puller recognized that the NCO corps was the backbone of the U.S. Armed Forces, and would sometimes bypass his officers and go directly to his NCOs. There is nothing better than getting feedback directly from NCOs. The observations are more direct, the learning is more instinctive and developed by real life situations, and the politics is less important than the people. This is an important contribution to our understanding of the tactical impediments to the campaign in Afghanistan.

But note that The NCOS Speak concerned Iraq where the rules were in my estimation too restrictive but still more robust than in Afghanistan. In spite of the bad examples from Iraq, Marines performed recon by fire, tanks fired point blank into buildings occupied by insurgents, and in Ramadi spotters were dealt with just like insurgents. They were engaged as if they were bringing a weapon to bear – because in fact they were.

In ancient times the hammer and anvil tactic consisted of a diversionary frontal assault carried out by an infantry formation against the enemy front line, while the cavalry swung aroung to the enemy rear to attack it from behind. The hammer and anvil tactic began with two enemy infantry units of varying strengths clashing in a frontal assault. While the rival infantry units fought one another, fixed in the engagement, a cavalry force maneuvered around the enemy and attacked from behind, hammering and pushing it hard against the friendly infantry line, which functioned as an anvil. In order to be successful, the force attempting the maneuver had to possess a superior amount of cavalry.

Background to the Battle of Bong Son

The South Vietnamese Army’s 22nd Division had been in pursuit of the North Vietnamese Army’s 3rd Division (2nd, 18th, and 22nd Regiments) in the Iron Triangle. As the North Vietnamese Army suddenly stopped and fought back hard, the commander of the 22nd Division, General Nguyen Thanh Sang asked for reinforcements by two South Vietnamese Army’s airborne battalions, which still were not enough. Then, the US 1st Cavalry Division, an airmobile unit of divisional strength commanded by Major General Harry Kinnard, was sent to assist.

Summary

The Battle of Bong Son began on January 28, 1966, when the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division, commanded by Colonel Moore, secured Bong Son airstrip, and then probed at the enemy, opening his serious operations in the area. Harry Kinnard had established base "Dog", on high ground along Highway 1. With as much stealth as possible, he moved part of his command into blocking positions at the north end of the plain. The plan was for Kinnard’s forces in the neighboring valleys, along with South Vietnamese units, to force the Communists to fall back.

The US 1st Cavalry attacked the 22nd regiment of the North Vietnamese Army’s 3rd Division from three directions. As this four-day fight wound down, Kinnard moved the US 2nd Brigade into the mountains at the An Lao valley, and the 3rd Brigade to the south end, where they were covered by artillery. United States Marines pressured the enemy force in the valley, while the South Vietnamese General Sang blocked the exists. This operation was of limited effect, as the enemy had moved into the jungle and mountains.

A reinforced battalion made a night air assault on the beaches east of Hoa Hoi and moved into the encirclement, with illumination from an AC-47 gunship, artillery, and the destroyer USS Uhlmann. The enemy was hit heavily by 105-millimetre (4.1 in) artillery fire from the Cavalry’s helicopter-lifted howitzers, and helicopters operated at night in fire support, supply, medical evacuation roles. AA B-52 strike also was made on the suspected 2nd Regiment command post, with limited results.

Although the CH-47 was originally manufactured by the American firm Boeing Vertol at the beginning of the 1960s, the Chinook is presently being built by Boeing Integrated Defense Systems. Like the UH-1 and C-130 aircraft, it is one of the few aircraft of the Vietnam War era which is still being produced. The Chinook helicopter has been sold to more than 16 nations.

Since CH-47 Chinook entered service in 1962, more powerful versions have been developed. The US Army’s first major design leap was the now-common CH-47D, which entered service in 1982. Improvements from the CH-47C included upgraded engines, composite rotor blades, a redesigned cockpit to reduce pilot workload, improved and redundant electrical systems, an advanced flight control system and improved avionics.

CH-47D Specifications

The UH-1 was the first turbine-powered helicopter to enter production for the United States military, as more than 16,000 units have been produced ever since worldwide, with variants, such as UH-1D, UH-1N Twin Huey, Bell 204/205, and Bell 212. The original designation of HU-1 led to the helicopter’s nickname of Huey, which was chosen as the official name by the US Marine Corps. The first combat operation of the UH-1 was during the Vietnam War. Approximately 7,000 UH-1 aircraft saw service in Vietnam.

Argentina was an important UH-1 operator. The Argentinian Army effectively used the Huey both as a transport and ground attack helicopter during the insurgent war in the jungles of Tucuman and Salta (Northwest of Argentina) to fight two communist guerrillas armies, the Montoneros and ERP (People´s Revolutionary Army) from 1973 to 1978. The Israeli Air Force was another prominent operator of the UH-1, using it for over thirty years in various different conflicts against both the armies of Arab countries and Palestinian militants. Israel’s first Hueys were UH-1Ds, delivered from the United States in October 1968 under arms shipments via the administration of Lyndon Johnson. Israel also acquired Italian UH-1s made by Augusta under license. In total, Israel acquired 64 UH-1s of different models.

Specifications

The Malayan Emergency was the colonial government’s term to refer to the conflict. The insurgent army called it the Anti-British National Liberation War. The rubber plantations and tin mining industries convinced the government to use the word "emergency" instead of "war" since their losses would not have been covered by Lloyd’s insurers if it had been called a "war." Although the communists had been defeated by 1960, communist leader Chin Peng renewed the war seven years later. That new war would last until 1989, and became known as the Communist Insurgency War. Despite the fact that Australian and British armed forces had fully withdrawn from Malaysia years earlier, the insurgency was again defeated by the Malaysian government.

Background to the Malayan Emergency

After World War II the Malayan economy lay in shambles as major social problems broke out, such as unemployment, low wages, scarce food, and high inflation. These economic problems caused social malaise and considerable labor unrest. From 1946 to 1948, a large number of strikes took place in Malaya. The British administration tried to mend Malaya’s economy quickly, as revenue from Malaya’s tin and rubber industries was important to Britain’s own post-war recovery. In order to deal with the protesters who rioted and caused problems, the colonial government passed several measures which included arrests and deportations. As a result, protesters became increasingly ideological militant and biased to the extreme left.

Summary of the Malayan Emergency War

The Malayan Emergency War broke out on June 16, 1948, when three European plantation managers were killed at Sungai Siput, Perak, by the Malayan National Liberation Army. It was the first overt act of war. To counteract the insurgent attacks, the British Army’s Director of Operations in Malaya, Harold Briggs, developed an overall multi-faceted strategy called the Briggs Plan. One aspect of it was the forced relocation of some 500,000 rural Malayans from squatter communities on the fringes of the forests into guarded camps known as New Villages. These villages were newly constructed in most cases, and were surrounded by barbed wire, police posts and floodlit areas, the purpose of which was both to keep the inhabitants in and the guerrillas out, cutting off the insurgents from their supporters amongst the population. Although People resented it at first, the majority soon became content with the better living standards in the villages. They were given money and ownership of the land they lived on. Removing a population which might be sympathetic to guerrillas was a counter-insurgency technique which the British had used before, notably against the Boer Commandos in the Second Boer War (1899–1902).

At the begining of the Malayan Emergency conflict, the British deployed 13 infantry battalions in Malaya: 7 Gurkha battalions, 3 British battalions, two battalions of the Royal Malay Regiment and a British Royal Artillery Regiment, which was used as infantry. Nevertheless, this force was too small to effectively fight the communist terrorists, and more infantry battalions were needed in Malaya. So, the British brought in more units, such as the Royal Marines, three battalions from Royal Australian Regiment, and a Special Air Service unit. The Australians would become extremely skillfull in this counter-insurgency war. Along with the SAS, they became the British lethal weapons in the jungle guerrilla war against the Malayan National Liberation Army. Operating deep in the jungle behind the enemy lines, the Australians and SAS wreaked havoc on the enemy.

In the hydro-pneumatic recoil mechanism, the gun’s barrel slid back on rollers, which included a set at the muzzle, when the shot was fired. The barrel of the French 75mm field gun was attached near the breech to a piston rod extending into an oil-filled cylinder placed just underneath the gun. When the barrel recoiled, the piston was pulled back by the barrel’s recoil and thus pushed the oil through a small orifice and into a second cylinder placed underneath. That second cylinder contained a freely floating piston which separated the surging oil from a confined volume of compressed air.