During the Korean War the F-86 Sabre fought against the Soviet MiG-15 in dogfight aerial combats. Although developed in the late 1940s and outdated by the end of the 1950s, the Sabre proved adaptable and continued as a front line fighter in air forces until the last active front line examples were retired by the Bolivian Air Force in 1994. Its success led to an extended production run of more than 7,800 aircraft between 1949 and 1956, in the United States, Japan and Italy. It was by far the most-produced Western jet fighter, with total production of all variants at 9,860 units. Variants were built in Canada and Australia. The Canadair Sabre added another 1,815 airframes, and the significantly redesigned CAC Sabre had a production run of 112.

Specifications

The F-86F-40-NA was powered by one General Electric J47-GE-27 turbojet, 5,910 lbf (maximum thrust at 7.950 rpm for five min). Its maximum speed was 680 mph at 1,500 ft with 14,212 lb (6,447 kg) combat weight. It had a range of 1,525 miles. The F-86 had a length of 37 ft 1 in (11.4 m) and a wingspan of 37 ft 0 in (11.3 m). Crew: 1 (pilot).

Armament

Specifications

The Republic F-105D Thunderchief was powered by one Pratt & Whitney J75-P-19W afterburning turbojet, which rendered the aircraft a maximum speed of mach 2.08 (1,372 mph, or 2,208 km/h) at 36,000 ft. Its range was 2,210 miles and its service ceiling 48,400 ft, or 14,700 m. It had a length of 64 ft 4.75 in and a wingspan of 34 ft 11.25 in (10.65 m). Crew: one (pilot).

On January 12, 1968, 4 Vietnam People’s Air Force Antonov An-2 biplanes had attempted to destroy the base. The Antonov An-2 planes had reached LS 85 and begun dropping 120 mm mortar rounds on the site and making strafing runs. The battle of Lima Site 85 was initiated on the night of March 10, 1968, when the North Vietnamese Army 766th Regiment launched a diversionary attack, preceded by an artillery barrage, against the US landing base.

"…occasionally there are riveting communications, such as a recent e-mail from a noncommissioned officer (NCO) serving in Afghanistan. He explains why the rules of engagement for U.S. troops are too prohibitive for coalition forces to achieve sustained tactical successes.

"Receiving mortar fire during an overnight mission, his unit called for a 155mm howitzer illumination round to be fired to reveal the enemy’s location. The request was rejected “on the grounds that it may cause collateral damage.” The NCO says that the only thing that comes down from an illumination round is a canister, and the likelihood of it hitting someone or something was akin to that of being struck by lightning.

"Returning from a mission, his unit took casualties from an improvised explosive device that the unit knew had been placed no more than an hour earlier. “There were villagers laughing at the U.S. casualties” and “two suspicious individuals were seen fleeing the scene and entering a home.” U.S. forces “are no longer allowed to search homes without Afghan National Security Forces personnel present.” But when his unit asked Afghan police to search the house, the police refused on the grounds that the people in the house "are good people."

"On another mission, some Afghan adults ran off with their children immediately before the NCO’s unit came under heavy small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and the unit asked for artillery fire on the enemy position. The response was a question: Where is the nearest civilian structure? “Judging distances,” the NCO writes dryly, “can be difficult when bullets and RPGs are flying over your head.” When the artillery support was denied because of fear of collateral damage, the unit asked for a “smoke mission” — like an illumination round; only the canister falls to earth — “to conceal our movement as we planned to flank and destroy the enemy.” This request was granted — but because of fear of collateral damage, the round was deliberately fired one kilometer off the requested site, making the smoke mission useless and leaving us to fend for ourselves."

Analysis of the rules of engagement in Afghanistan

This letter seems to have been written in the spirit of The NCOs Speak on Rules of Engagement. Legendary Marine Chesty Puller recognized that the NCO corps was the backbone of the U.S. Armed Forces, and would sometimes bypass his officers and go directly to his NCOs. There is nothing better than getting feedback directly from NCOs. The observations are more direct, the learning is more instinctive and developed by real life situations, and the politics is less important than the people. This is an important contribution to our understanding of the tactical impediments to the campaign in Afghanistan.

But note that The NCOS Speak concerned Iraq where the rules were in my estimation too restrictive but still more robust than in Afghanistan. In spite of the bad examples from Iraq, Marines performed recon by fire, tanks fired point blank into buildings occupied by insurgents, and in Ramadi spotters were dealt with just like insurgents. They were engaged as if they were bringing a weapon to bear – because in fact they were.

In ancient times the hammer and anvil tactic consisted of a diversionary frontal assault carried out by an infantry formation against the enemy front line, while the cavalry swung aroung to the enemy rear to attack it from behind. The hammer and anvil tactic began with two enemy infantry units of varying strengths clashing in a frontal assault. While the rival infantry units fought one another, fixed in the engagement, a cavalry force maneuvered around the enemy and attacked from behind, hammering and pushing it hard against the friendly infantry line, which functioned as an anvil. In order to be successful, the force attempting the maneuver had to possess a superior amount of cavalry.