1) To interdict the flow of men and material into South Vietnam; 2) to persuade North Vietnam to cease its support for the communist insurgency in South Vietnam without actually taking any ground forces into communist North Vietnam; 3) to destroy North Vietnam’s transportation system, industrial base, and air defenses; 4) To boost the sagging morale of the Saigon regime in the Republic of Vietnam. Attainment of these objectives was made difficult by both the restraints imposed upon the U.S and its allies by Cold War exigencies and by the military aid and assistance received by North Vietnam from its communist allies, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

The Operation Rolling Thunder was the most intense air/ground battle waged during the Cold War period, indeed, it was the most difficult such campaign fought by the US Air Force since the aerial bombardment of Nazi Germany during World War II. Due to the high-tech arms supplies provided by its communist allies, North Vietnam fielded a potent mixture of sophisticated air-to-air and ground-to-air weapons that created one of the most effective air defense environments ever faced by American military aviators.

"…occasionally there are riveting communications, such as a recent e-mail from a noncommissioned officer (NCO) serving in Afghanistan. He explains why the rules of engagement for U.S. troops are too prohibitive for coalition forces to achieve sustained tactical successes.

"Receiving mortar fire during an overnight mission, his unit called for a 155mm howitzer illumination round to be fired to reveal the enemy’s location. The request was rejected “on the grounds that it may cause collateral damage.” The NCO says that the only thing that comes down from an illumination round is a canister, and the likelihood of it hitting someone or something was akin to that of being struck by lightning.

"Returning from a mission, his unit took casualties from an improvised explosive device that the unit knew had been placed no more than an hour earlier. “There were villagers laughing at the U.S. casualties” and “two suspicious individuals were seen fleeing the scene and entering a home.” U.S. forces “are no longer allowed to search homes without Afghan National Security Forces personnel present.” But when his unit asked Afghan police to search the house, the police refused on the grounds that the people in the house "are good people."

"On another mission, some Afghan adults ran off with their children immediately before the NCO’s unit came under heavy small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and the unit asked for artillery fire on the enemy position. The response was a question: Where is the nearest civilian structure? “Judging distances,” the NCO writes dryly, “can be difficult when bullets and RPGs are flying over your head.” When the artillery support was denied because of fear of collateral damage, the unit asked for a “smoke mission” — like an illumination round; only the canister falls to earth — “to conceal our movement as we planned to flank and destroy the enemy.” This request was granted — but because of fear of collateral damage, the round was deliberately fired one kilometer off the requested site, making the smoke mission useless and leaving us to fend for ourselves."

Analysis of the rules of engagement in Afghanistan

This letter seems to have been written in the spirit of The NCOs Speak on Rules of Engagement. Legendary Marine Chesty Puller recognized that the NCO corps was the backbone of the U.S. Armed Forces, and would sometimes bypass his officers and go directly to his NCOs. There is nothing better than getting feedback directly from NCOs. The observations are more direct, the learning is more instinctive and developed by real life situations, and the politics is less important than the people. This is an important contribution to our understanding of the tactical impediments to the campaign in Afghanistan.

But note that The NCOS Speak concerned Iraq where the rules were in my estimation too restrictive but still more robust than in Afghanistan. In spite of the bad examples from Iraq, Marines performed recon by fire, tanks fired point blank into buildings occupied by insurgents, and in Ramadi spotters were dealt with just like insurgents. They were engaged as if they were bringing a weapon to bear – because in fact they were.

In ancient times the hammer and anvil tactic consisted of a diversionary frontal assault carried out by an infantry formation against the enemy front line, while the cavalry swung aroung to the enemy rear to attack it from behind. The hammer and anvil tactic began with two enemy infantry units of varying strengths clashing in a frontal assault. While the rival infantry units fought one another, fixed in the engagement, a cavalry force maneuvered around the enemy and attacked from behind, hammering and pushing it hard against the friendly infantry line, which functioned as an anvil. In order to be successful, the force attempting the maneuver had to possess a superior amount of cavalry.

After a series of operations, in which South Vietnam commandos were captured after insertion into North Vietnam, Studies and Observations Group shifted the emphasis of its activities to maritime operations. A small fleet of fast patrol boats was acquired for use in the landing of small action teams and the offshore bombardment of small North Vietnamese military facilities, such as radar installations. The pace of these operations accelerated between June and July 1964.

During the time Operation Plan 34A was being implemented, the US Navy carried out electronic surveillance called Operation Desoto. It was conducted by destroyers operating along the coast of North Vietnam. Although the two sets of operations were at least nominally independent of one another, the attacks carried out by the patrol boats provoked responses by the North Vietnamese military that were monitored by the American destroyers, thus providing very useful intelligence on DRV military capabilities.

The complementary conventional strategy, which consisted in attacking and capturing an enemy position, then fortifying and holding it indefinitely, was known as Clear and Hold or Clear and Secure. In theory, since the traditional methods of "taking ground" could not be used in this war, a war of attrition would be used, eliminating the enemy by the use of "searching" for them, then "destroying" them, and the "body count" would be the measuring tool to determine the success of the strategy of Seek and Destroy. It is common practice among military forces to enforce strict rules on a search and destroy mission.

It became an offensive tool, crucial to General William Westmoreland’s second phase. In his three phase strategy, the first consisted of slowing down the Viet Cong Forces; the second was to resume the offensive and destroy the enemy; the third was to restore the area under South Vietnamese government control. The Zippo missions were mainly assigned to the second phase around 1966 and 1967, along with operations “Clear and Secure.”

In 1966 journalist Gerald Stone described tactics then being used by Australian soldiers newly arrived in Vietnam:

"The Australian battalion has been described …as the safest combat force in Vietnam… It is widely felt that the Australians have shown themselves able to give chase to the guerillas without exposing themselves to the lethal ambushes that have claimed so many American dead. Australian patrols avoided jungle tracks and clearings… picking their way carefully and quietly through bamboo thickets and tangled foliage…It is a frustrating experience to trek through the jungle with Australians. Patrols have taken as much as nine hours to sweep a mile of terrain. They move forward a few steps at a time, stop, listen, then proceed again."

Looking back on ten years of reporting the war in Vietnam and Cambodia, journalist Neil Davis said in 1983, "I was very proud of the Australian troops. They were very professional, very well trained and they fought the people they were sent to fight—the Viet Cong. They tried not to involve civilians and generally there were fewer casualties inflicted by the Australians." Another perspective on Australian operations was provided by David Hackworth, Vietnam’s most decorated US soldier. "The Aussies used squads to make contact… and brought in reinforcements to do the killing; they planned in the belief that a platoon on the battlefield could do anything."

For some Viet Cong leaders there was no doubt the Australian jungle warfare approach was effective. One former Viet Cong leader is quoted as saying; "Worse than the Americans were the Australians. The Americans style was to hit us, then call for planes and artillery. Our response was to break contact and disappear if we could… The Australians were more patient than the Americans, better guerilla fighters, better at ambushes. They liked to stay with us instead of calling in the planes. We were more afraid of their style." However, The American concept of how the war should be fought remained unchallenged and it prevailed almost by default.

The trail was a complex maze of clandestine truck dirt roads, paths for foot and bicycle traffic, and river transportation systems which functioned as important supply lines for the Viet Cong in their war against the South Vietnamese Army and American forces deployed there. The name, taken from North Vietnamese president Ho Chi Minh, is of American origin. Although the trail was mostly in Laos, the communists called it the Truong Son Strategic Supply Route, after a mountain range in central Vietnam. According to the U.S. National Security Agency’s official history of the war, the Trail system was "one of the great achievements of military engineering of the 20th century."