The usual deployment would see the men of the squad in pairs in foxholes, trenches, or ditches, posted close enough to communicate with their partner. These little sub-section nests would be slightly separated, echeloned, or at different levels, thus decreasing the effect of enemy fire. In the event that the enemy attack did not materialize immediately, the second phase of construction would see the digging of trenches behind the main line in which much of the squad could be kept back under cover until needed. Good camouflage was complemented by the avoidance of any obvious movement to attract enemy observation. The defensive fire fight was iniciated by the machine gun at effective range, riflemen remaining concealed until the enemy assault, at which all were to open fire regardless of cover. Hand grenades falling on the position were to be dealt with either by the men diving away into cover, or by picking up the grenade and throwing it back.

The Decisive Maneuver strategy used infantry to attack the enemy’s line of retreat, trapping it in pockets. Blitzkrieg, however used concentrations of tanks, mechanized infantry and Luftwaffe dive-bombers to punch a hole in the enemy line, and penetrate into rear areas to destroy the enemy command center, forcing a total collapse in enemy morale. The Polish campaign and the invasion of Norway were conducted according to the principles of Decisive Maneuver, while the Western Offensive was Blitzkrieg.

Under Wellington’s command, the English could also be very aggressive. The river crossing at Oporto, Iberian Peninsula, was a gamble; and only the mistake of a subordinate officer allowed any of Soult’s army to escape. On the attack also, the British showed a clear understanding of tactics and terrain: at the Battle of Vitoria, Wellington led a massive, well-coordinated attack in from three directions, almost destroying the French army, forcing them to abandon all their baggage and supplies and all but one of their 138 guns.

The Defense of the Reich was the longest campaign sustained in the history of aerial warfare. As the Luftwaffe had been conceived as an offensive weapon, the Germans had not foreseen the need for a defensive force to guard its airspace, even after being forced onto the defensive during the winter of 1942–1943. Thus the Luftwaffe continued to produce bomber aircraft despite the resurgence of the Allied Air Forces’ offensive power. Finally German fighter aviation was given priority and defense became the Luftwaffe’s primary focus. In the period 1940–1943 the Luftwaffe successfully defended its territory and inflicted several defeats on both RAF Bomber Command and the USAAF. These victories were largely the result of the superiority of the German pilots and fighter aircraft and also of the Western Allies’ lack of a long-range escort fighter.

1) To interdict the flow of men and material into South Vietnam; 2) to persuade North Vietnam to cease its support for the communist insurgency in South Vietnam without actually taking any ground forces into communist North Vietnam; 3) to destroy North Vietnam’s transportation system, industrial base, and air defenses; 4) To boost the sagging morale of the Saigon regime in the Republic of Vietnam. Attainment of these objectives was made difficult by both the restraints imposed upon the U.S and its allies by Cold War exigencies and by the military aid and assistance received by North Vietnam from its communist allies, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

The Operation Rolling Thunder was the most intense air/ground battle waged during the Cold War period, indeed, it was the most difficult such campaign fought by the US Air Force since the aerial bombardment of Nazi Germany during World War II. Due to the high-tech arms supplies provided by its communist allies, North Vietnam fielded a potent mixture of sophisticated air-to-air and ground-to-air weapons that created one of the most effective air defense environments ever faced by American military aviators.

"…occasionally there are riveting communications, such as a recent e-mail from a noncommissioned officer (NCO) serving in Afghanistan. He explains why the rules of engagement for U.S. troops are too prohibitive for coalition forces to achieve sustained tactical successes.

"Receiving mortar fire during an overnight mission, his unit called for a 155mm howitzer illumination round to be fired to reveal the enemy’s location. The request was rejected “on the grounds that it may cause collateral damage.” The NCO says that the only thing that comes down from an illumination round is a canister, and the likelihood of it hitting someone or something was akin to that of being struck by lightning.

"Returning from a mission, his unit took casualties from an improvised explosive device that the unit knew had been placed no more than an hour earlier. “There were villagers laughing at the U.S. casualties” and “two suspicious individuals were seen fleeing the scene and entering a home.” U.S. forces “are no longer allowed to search homes without Afghan National Security Forces personnel present.” But when his unit asked Afghan police to search the house, the police refused on the grounds that the people in the house "are good people."

"On another mission, some Afghan adults ran off with their children immediately before the NCO’s unit came under heavy small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and the unit asked for artillery fire on the enemy position. The response was a question: Where is the nearest civilian structure? “Judging distances,” the NCO writes dryly, “can be difficult when bullets and RPGs are flying over your head.” When the artillery support was denied because of fear of collateral damage, the unit asked for a “smoke mission” — like an illumination round; only the canister falls to earth — “to conceal our movement as we planned to flank and destroy the enemy.” This request was granted — but because of fear of collateral damage, the round was deliberately fired one kilometer off the requested site, making the smoke mission useless and leaving us to fend for ourselves."

Analysis of the rules of engagement in Afghanistan

This letter seems to have been written in the spirit of The NCOs Speak on Rules of Engagement. Legendary Marine Chesty Puller recognized that the NCO corps was the backbone of the U.S. Armed Forces, and would sometimes bypass his officers and go directly to his NCOs. There is nothing better than getting feedback directly from NCOs. The observations are more direct, the learning is more instinctive and developed by real life situations, and the politics is less important than the people. This is an important contribution to our understanding of the tactical impediments to the campaign in Afghanistan.

But note that The NCOS Speak concerned Iraq where the rules were in my estimation too restrictive but still more robust than in Afghanistan. In spite of the bad examples from Iraq, Marines performed recon by fire, tanks fired point blank into buildings occupied by insurgents, and in Ramadi spotters were dealt with just like insurgents. They were engaged as if they were bringing a weapon to bear – because in fact they were.